Level 1. Deviation
ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & Defenses
- Developer
- Not established
- Model
- Not established
- When it happened
- February 1, 2025
- When it was disclosed
- Not established
- How well it is stood up
- Not verified yet
- What caused it
- Not established
- Where it stands now
- Not established
What happened
Reported by embracethered.com. Listed here with a link to their report. Nobody on this side has checked it against that report, so it carries no level and this is not our account of what happened.
Our assessment
- Actual
- 1 of 5Deviation
- Potential
- 3 of 5Significant control incident
The system behaved contrary to its instructions, and it stayed contained. The potential level is what the behaviour demonstrated here could credibly have led to, judged from the same evidence.
This level rests on news reports. The developer has not confirmed it here.
This happened in a test, an evaluation or a demonstration. Nobody real was harmed, so the actual level stays at 1. What it showed counts toward the potential level.
To demonstrate that the Prompt Injection Monitor can be bypassed by a motivated adversary, I put together a couple of demos that I shared with OpenAI about three weeks ago, since I wanted to make sure they have a heads-up, and can mitigate this technique.
Why this level
- The system acted autonomously. Argues for a potential level of 3
- A safeguard was bypassed. Argues for a potential level of 2
What is established, and what is not
Confirmed
Nothing is confirmed yet.
Reported, not confirmed
The system acted autonomously
Now comes the interesting part: Operator goes back to the GitHub issues and now focuses on the main task, which is to navigate the account settings page of news.ycombinator.com , copy out the private email address, and then switch back to the malicious webpage to paste the data—leading to the attacker receiving the information.
ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & DefensesA safeguard was bypassed
To demonstrate that the Prompt Injection Monitor can be bypassed by a motivated adversary, I put together a couple of demos that I shared with OpenAI about three weeks ago, since I wanted to make sure they have a heads-up, and can mitigate this technique.
ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & Defenses
Checked, and did not happen
Nothing here was checked and ruled out.
Not confirmed
Nothing is outstanding.
Where this came from
The original report · read September 19, 2026
ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & DefensesA structured incident database · read September 18, 2026
AI Agent Incident Database by sipi.bot (CC BY 4.0)
The reports above are other people’s. The levels are ours, worked out under our published rules. No organisation that reported this assigned our number, and none of it is legal advice.
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